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SIPDIS

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [MOPS](#) [PREL](#) [KDEM](#) [IZ](#)

SUBJECT: DPM CHALABI ON IMPROVING MOD, PIPELINE SECURITY
AND SUNNI OUTREACH

Classified By: Classified by Political Military Counselor Ronald
[1](#)E. Neumann for Reasons 1.4 (a), (b), and (d)

[1](#)1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Chalabi outlined his top three priorities to PolMilCouns on June 3. He claims to be engaging MoD Sadoun Dulaimi on improving MOD staff to combat corruption and replacing Army officers in select units with locally born commanders. Chalabi also briefed his position on the stand-up of the pipeline security forces and his outreach efforts to engage Sunni Sheikhs. END SUMMARY.

[1](#)2. (C) Claiming he was close to the new Minister of Defense, Chalabi described Dulaimi as "beleaguered" as he grapples with the level of corruption in the ministry. Chalabi suggested recruiting professional technocrats to fill mid-level ministry slots. He pushed for drawing on the cadre of USG-trained Iraqis who received DoD training before the war. While he did not say so, we suspect many are members of Chalabi's political party. He also recommended replacing the commanding officers of select brigade and battalions in some of the most troubled areas with officers native to the region. Chalabi believes this could temper the insurgency. PolMilCouns noted our strong view that professional military leaders should not be changed for political reasons. Chalabi said he was not advocating a purge and hoped we could talk in detail. Subsequently, the Minister of Defense made clear to PolMilCouns that he has no intention of changing commanders for political purposes. He said Iraq will have problems to sustain financially the current size of the military the U.S. and Iraq are standing up.

[1](#)3. (C) Chalabi noted the country had lost \$1 billion trying to protect the pipelines since liberation. He just returned from Kirkuk to survey several strategic (and heavily targeted) portions of the line and appeared confident that current interministerial planning for a new security forces would be successful. Gathering intelligence in the areas along the pipeline were vital to its protection. He mentioned the Minister of State for National Security al Anzi had proposed setting up a new intelligence agency, firmly under Anzi's control. Chalabi reported Anzi has approached the Prime Minister for \$40 million to fund the effort. Chalabi registered his firm opposition to this plan, but appeared unsure whether he alone could block it. Chalabi added that INIS Director Shahwani is making the situation worse by refusing to show up at important meetings or deal with the Government.

[1](#)4. (C) Chalabi claimed he conducts his own campaign of Sunni outreach, meeting with many individuals privately. He asked Deputy Prime Minister Abd Mutlak al Jaboori to accompany him on his recent trip to Kirkuk, "his neighborhood" according to Chalabi. The purpose was twofold: to bolster his efforts to reach out to Sunni tribal leaders and to use such contacts for the gathering of better intelligence on those targeting Iraqi's oil infrastructure. Despite his well known credibility problems with the Sunnis, Chalabi asserted that reconciling them would be among his primary tasks.

[1](#)5. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK, minimize considered.
Satterfield